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Sufficiency of Vouchers
By John B. Geijsbeek
The young student of accounting is often faced with the
problem as to whether or not a voucher presented to him is suf
ficient. Sometimes the experienced accountant is befogged in
this issue because of the practicable application of business meth
ods which may often become loose and silently sanctioned by
virtue of their long use.
Text-books of law are not very explicit on the subject. Text
books of accounting are far more silent on the subject than the
text-books of law. It therefore becomes interesting to review a
recent decision of the circuit court of appeals of the United
States, especially as the opinion of the court is plain and lengthy.
The case is well stated by the district judge except that it should
be emphasized that while this decision is not in the supreme court
of the United States the status of the litigation and the issues in
the case are such that it could not be appealed to the supreme
court at Washington—therefore the decision is final.
It will be noted that the legal points advanced by the lawyers
were not sustained by the court but that the contention of the
accountant (in this case the writer of this article) as to the insuf
ficiency of the vouchers was sustained by the upper court and
the case was won on that principle.
The case covers (1) the sufficiency of vouchers, (2) the
vexing legal question of testimony offered against a “dead man,”
(3) the rights of individual stockholders to bind a corporation
without corporate action and (4) the value of the customary
annual whitewash resolution of the stockholders approving all
the accounts and acts of the officers and directors.
The defendant in the case (who was the manager as well as
a trustee) in the master’s court in an endeavor to explain the
vouchers he had presented in his accounting, reiterated hour after
hour, day after day and week after week that the vouchers con
taining no detail were expended “for the benefit of the company”
and that while he did not remember the detail he knew it to be so
from the fact that he signed the cheque and that he marked on
the cheque the words “general expense.” There was nothing on
the vouchers to indicate for what the money was expended or to
whom the amount was paid, all cheques in dispute having been
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drawn to defendant with some general designation, usually in
the form: “to reimburse for expenses paid.” The judges of the
upper and lower court sustained the master and allowed every
voucher and cheque drawn to parties other than the manager,
even though the voucher was not fully or partly itemized.
The master allowed and the upper court disallowed, however,
all “nondescript” vouchers drawn in favor of the manager. The
decision shows the important connection there is between the
minutes and the vouchers.
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS,
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 5265—December Term, A. D. 1919.
The Wootton Land & Fuel Company et al, appellants, v. J. A. Ownbey,
appellee. (Appeal from the district court of the United States for
the district of Colorado.)
No. 5266—December Term, A. D. 1919.
J. A. Ownbey, appellant, v. John Pierpont Morgan, et al, appellees.
(Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district
of Colorado.)
Before Hook and Stone, circuit judges, and Munger, district judge.
These cases present an appeal and a cross appeal from a decree in
a suit for accounting. It was brought by the holders of a majority of
the capital stock of the Wootton Land & Fuel Company, a corporation
(hereafter called the Wootton Company), and for the benefit of that
company and of all its stockholders, and its main object was to secure
an accounting from the defendant J. A. Ownbey, as one of its officers,
of corporate property and money received by him. The Wootton Com
pany was incorporated in 1906 under the laws of Delaware. The com
pany acquired a large amount of land in Colorado and New Mexico,
operated extensive coal mines situated on this land and owned and
managed coal tipples, power-house and other shops and buildings
connected with its mining operations. It had a large number of houses
in which miners lived as its tenants. It operated a general merchandise
store. It also operated a ranch of over ten thousand acres upon which
it kept live-stock. The laws of Delaware provided that the business
of every corporation should be managed by a board of not less than three
or more than thirteen directors. Rev. code of Delaware (1915), Sec. 1923.
The articles of incorporation of the Wootton Company provided that
its affairs should be managed by a board of five directors, who could
adopt bylaws for the management of the company’s business. The
capital stock of the company was divided into 100,000 shares. At its
organization this stock was owned as follows: J. P. Morgan, 41,667
shares; Ogden Mills, 16,667 shares; B P. Cheney, 8,333 shares, and
J. A. Ownbey, 33,321 shares; the remaining twelve shares then and
ever since stood in the name of four other persons for the purpose of
qualifying them to act as directors, but the real ownership was in some
of the principal stockholders’ names or in their successors in interest.
The five directors at all times have been the four persons holding such
qualifying shares and Mr. Ownbey. Mr. Mills sold his stock early
in 1909 to Morgan and Cheney.
The president of the corporation from its organization until Feb
ruary 27, 1908, was William C. Prime and thereafter was Thomas W.
Joyce. Mr. Ownbey has been vice-president and treasurer since the
company’s organization and after February 27, 1908, was authorized
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generally to direct the operations of the company and to supervise
and manage its affairs and employees. Mr. Ownbey resided on the
company’s land and was the active manager of the company’s physical
property there and directed its business operations. Mr. Cheney was
a visitor for a very short time at the company’s property on several
occasions, but Mr. Morgan never saw the property. Neither Mr.
Morgan nor Mr. Cheney were ever directors or officers of the cor
poration. The directors of the corporation held meetings from time
to time, and minutes were kept of their action. Such meetings were
held on October 17, 1906; on February 16, and March 5, 1907; on
February 10, February 27, 1908, and on March 28, 1910.
Under the issues formed by the pleadings the propriety of an
accounting was not disputed, and a master was appointed by the court
for that purpose and his report was confirmed by the court, over the
exceptions of both parties, and each has presented an appeal to this
court.
One of the chief questions in the case is the effect that is to be
given to conversations between Mr. Morgan, Mr. Cheney and Mr.
Ownbey, in New York in 1909, in which Mr. Ownbey claims that
agreements were made, binding on the Wootton Company (1) that in
consideration of some proposed slight changes in the amount of
capital stock held by these three stockholders and because of a pro
posed transfer to the company of some property, theretofore held for
it in trust by Mr. Ownbey, it was agreed between these three stock
holders that all claims between the company and these stockholders
should thereafter be extinguished and that this agreement was carried
into effect at a meeting of the stockholders on April 16, 1910, when
Mr. Ownbey presented a full report of his transactions with the com
pany and it was approved; (2) that Mr. Ownbey was to have a salary
from the Wootton Company of $1,000 per month and also to have his
living expenses, not to exceed $500.00 per month.
A special defense in Ownbey’s answer set forth his claim that he
had fully accounted for his transactions before April 16, 1910, as fol
lows: “avers that on April 16, 1910, all of the acts and doings of this
defendant and all transactions by him and in the premises for and on
behalf of said company were duly and fully presented to the stock
holders of said company at a meeting thereof held on said day at
the town of Wootton, Colorado, and at which all stock of said com
pany was represented and voting, and that all of his said acts and
doings theretofore so had, done and performed, by him for and on
behalf of said company and said stockholders, were then and there
fully ratified and confirmed and in all respects approved thereby.”
Because of the issue presented by this special defense the case was
first referred to a special master to hear testimony and to report
whether on April 16, 1910, the accounts between the Wootton Com
pany and Ownbey “were settled and adjusted, and if so settled and
adjusted, what balance of account, if any, existed and was fixed as the
result of said settlement and adjustment, and against which of said
parties.” The master was also directed to report whether any such
accounting or settlement was valid, so as to preclude any further ac
counting, and he was directed not to proceed with the accounting until
after the court had disposed of this issue. After the hearing on this
issue the master reported that Morgan, Cheney and Ownbey were the
only persons beneficially interested in the ownership of the capital
stock of the Wootton Company on December 15, 16 and 17, 1909, and
that then these three persons met in New York and agreed among
themselves for the conveyance to the company of certain property and
that all claims between these three stockholders and between the com
pany and each of them should be settled and adjusted and the stock of
the Wootton Company should be redistributed and that a meeting of
the company should thereafter be held to carry this agreement into
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effect. The master further found that on April 16, 1910, all of the
stockholders were present or represented by proxies at a meeting of
all the stockholders at Wootton, Colorado, that Ownbey then pre
sented a report showing all of his transactions with the company and
the moneys received and paid out by him on its behalf, and that this
report was examined and found correct and by unanimous vote it was
approved. He reported that no testimony had been offered to show
what balance of account was shown by the report and that he could
not determine what balance, if any, existed, nor against which of the
parties. He found that the property referred to was at that meeting
conveyed to the Wootton Company and the stock redistributed. The
master reported as his conclusion that the stockholders were there
fore precluded from having an accounting for transactions prior to
April 16, 1910. The court approved of this report, over objections of
appellants, and ordered the accounting to proceed of transactions
after April 16, 1910. After a prolonged hearing the master stated an
account, and exceptions of both parties thereto were overruled and
the master’s final report was approved and judgment was rendered in
favor of Ownbey for $53,280.67 against the Wootton Company.
Munger, district judge (after stating the facts above) delivered the
opinion of the court.
The special master allowed Ownbey a sum for salary and his liv
ing expenses. This was based upon testimony by Ownbey and Cheney
as to the alleged agreement between Morgan, Cheney and Ownbey,
at Morgan’s library in New York City, in December, 1909, whereby it
is claimed Ownbey was to receive this allowance. The finding of the
master that Ownbey was not required to account to the company for
his transactions occurring before April 16, 1910, was also partly based
upon this conversation and agreements claimed to have been made
at that time. By proper exceptions the question is presented, upon
such facts, whether those who are not directors or officers of a cor
poration, but are the owners and holders of almost all of the capital
stock and are the beneficial owners of the remaining shares, which
stand in the names of nominal owners, may bind the corporation by
a contract between themselves whereby a debt in favor of the corpo
ration is to be extinguished and an obligation of the corporation in
favor of one of them imposed, when the articles of incorporation
place the management of the company’s affairs in the hands of its
board of directors. The further question is also presented, whether
such stockholders, assuming to contract on behalf of the corporation,
are estopped from denying such an agreement to be the agreement of
the corporation, if the obligee has acted upon the faith of this agree
ment as an act of the corporation. The general rule as to contracts
and conveyances on behalf of the corporation was stated by Chief
Justice Shaw in Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. 371,385, as follows:
“The individual members of the corporation, whether they should
all join, or each act severally, have no right or power to intermeddle
with the property or concerns of the bank, or call any officer, agent
or servant to account, or discharge them from any liability. Should
all the stockholders join in a power of attorney to any one, he could
not take possession of any real or personal estate, any security, or
chose in action; could not collect a debt, or discharge a claim, or
release damage arising from any default; simply because they are not
the legal owners of the property, and damage done to such property
is not an injury to them. Their rights and their powers are limited
and well defined” and this rule has often been followed. Humphreys v.
McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, 312; De La Vergne Co. v. German Savings Inst.,
175 U. S. 40, 53, 54; Sellers v. Greer, 172 Ill. 549, 50 N. E. 246; Puritan
Coal Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 237 Pa. 420, 85 Atl. 426, 432;
2 Cook on Corps. (7th Ed. Sec. 709). See also First Nat. Bank of Mem
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phis, Tenn. v. Towner, 239 Fed. 433, 440; Woodruff v. Shimer, 174 Fed.
584, 586; Denver Engineering Works Co. v. Elkins, 179 Fed. 922.
But the principle of equitable estoppel is frequently applied to
deny a defense that might otherwise have prevailed. Nothing is
better settled than that one, who, by his acts or representation or by
his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist
and the latter rightfully acts on such belief, so that he would be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such
facts, is thereby conclusively estopped from making such denial.
Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578, 580; Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. United
States, 67 Fed. 975, 979; Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Northern Miss.
Ry. Co., 209 Fed. 758; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. Sec. 805.
In this case Morgan and Cheney, stockholders but assuming to act
for the corporation, are said to have made a contract for the benefit
of the corporation with Ownbey, the owner of the remainder of its
stock, and Ownbey claiming to have relied upon those agreements
alleges he has executed his part of the agreement. If the contracting
stockholders permitted Ownbey to render services and expend moneys
and to act in accordance with such a contract they may not be heard
in a suit brought for the benefit of themselves, as the only other
owners of stock, to deny the validity of the assent of the corporation.
Colorado Springs Co. v. American Pub. Co., 97 Fed. 843, 853; United States
v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255; Breslin v.
Fried-Breslin Co., 70 N. J. Law 274, 282, 58 Atl. 313; in re Newman, L. R.
(1895), 1 Ch. 674, 686; Ebelhar v. Nave, 119 S.W. 1176; First Nat. Bank
v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 So. 351; Bundy v. Iron Co., 38 Ch. St.
300-311, 312; Brown v. De Young, 167 Ill. 549, 555, 47N.E. 863.
In Ownbey’s answer he set forth a counter claim alleging an em
ployment as manager for the company, the performance of the services
and that they were reasonably worth $1,000 per month. Appellants
assert that proof of an express contract for payment of that amount
for such services was inadmissible under the plea of quantum meruit
Appellants in their replication to this answer alleged the non-existence
of any contract express or implied between the company and Ownbey,
relating to compensation for his services. In an action for an account
ing no cross bill on the part of the defendant is necessary in order
that he may recover any balance in his favor. The plaintiff by his
bill in such a case submits himself to the result of the accounting
whether it be for or against him. Whittemore v. Patten, 84 Fed. 51, 56;
McManus v. Sawyer, 231 Fed. 231, 238; 1 Corp. Jur. 639.
The court, on an application of the master for instructions relating
to the taking of the account, ordered the master to disregard all
matters of pleading and to proceed with the accounting in accord
ance with equity rule No. 63. No exception was taken to this order
and it is now too late to insist that Ownbey was limited to the proof
of an implied contract for services.
This brings us to the next controverted question, whether agree
ments were made such as Ownbey claims. As to the salary and living
expenses, both Cheney and Ownbey testified that a verbal agreement
was made at a meeting of the three men in Morgan’s library by which
Ownbey was to continue as the business manager of the company and
that he was to receive for such services $1,000 per month and also his
living expenses for himself and family, not to exceed $500 per
month. Morgan’s death before this suit was brought precluded the
possibility of testimony from the only other participant in this al
leged transaction, but there are many circumstances that militate
against the probability of any such contract. Some of these facts may
be briefly stated. Ownbey never drew or demanded any salary in the
fifty-seven months that he continued to act. The company’s books
were kept under his direction and no entry was made relating to
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either of such items. In a voluminous correspondence thereafter main
tained between Ownbey and Morgan, Cheney, Mills and Joyce, no
mention is made of the subject. The two bookkeepers testified that
Ownbey told them his agreement was that he was to receive no
salary, but that he should have the profits of the boarding-house in
lieu of it, and these profits were credited to his account on the books.
In monthly statements sent from Ownbey to the stockholders and
president of the company after the middle of 1910 there was a per
sonal account showing the profits of the boarding-house to be credited
to Ownbey but no charge against the company for salary or living
expenses was shown. In June, 1911, Ownbey wrote Cheney a letter,
copy of which was sent to Joyce, in which he stated that the amount
the company owed him was $3,000 and also the sum of $15,000, be
cause he had given his personal cheque for the $15,000 to take up that
amount of the company’s obligations. His salary up to that time at
the rate he claims would have amounted to $14,000. In his answer he
set forth a counter claim for the reasonable value of his services, but
did not plead any agreement that he was to be paid a salary or be
allowed his living expenses. The plaintiff employed an accountant
in December, 1915, to go over the company’s books and he told
Ownbey that the books showed a balance against him, that there was
nothing on the books to show an allowance for salary or living ex
penses. Ownbey replied that there should be such entries, and that
he had an agreement, and that it was in the correspondence, but fail
ing to find it, he claimed it was in the minutes, and again failing to
find any note of it there, claimed it was a verbal agreement. He was
asked as to the amount of his salary but he deferred answering until
he had seen his attorney and then stated that he was to have $1,000
per month for both salary and expenses after April 16, 1910. Ownbey
on behalf of the corporation in 1912 asked for a loan from a bank,
and the bank required an audit of the books. Ownbey hired auditors
who reported to Ownbey in writing that no salary was charged for
him but that he was credited with profits on the boarding-house for
1911. The bank made the loan on the faith of this report. The cor
poration records are silent as to any allowance to Ownbey for these
purposes. Ownbey explains some of these admissions by the state
ment that he did not wish the bookkeepers to be advised of the amount
of his salary lest they should demand higher salaries and this was
pursuant to an understanding he had with Cheney and Morgan.
Ownbey gave practically his entire time to the management of the
company’s affairs and they were extensive and required the careful
supervision by someone who lived at the scene of operation. It is
not incredible that someone should have been employed and have
been given a liberal salary and a liberal allowance for living expenses
for doing this work, inasmuch as Cheney and Morgan were absent,
and the responsibilities were onerous. The circumstances we have
detailed and others tend to discredit the existence of such a contract,
if it depended alone upon the testimony of Ownbey, but Cheney’s
testimony as to the making of the contract is clear and no sufficient
impeaching evidence discredits his testimony. While the view of this
court might be in favor of a different conclusion from the testimony
of Ownbey the case is one where a master and the trial court have
concurred in a finding of fact upon conflicting evidence, and that
finding should be confirmed by this court (Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S.
631, 636; Coder v. Arts, 152 Fed. 943, 946; Nicholas v. Elkin, 225 Fed.
689, 692), and this result is compelled, if credence is given to Cheney’s
undisputed testimony.
The finding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an accounting
of transactions between the corporation and Ownbey prior to April
16, 1910, rests upon the testimony of Ownbey and Cheney taken upon
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the hearing upon the special defense and upon the interpretation of
the minutes of the stockholders’ meeting held on that day. The court
may have been influenced in its final confirmation of the master’s
findings by the testimony of these same witnesses as to this conver
sation which was again given later during the hearing and upon other
features of the case. A careful review of the evidence of these wit
nesses leads to the conclusion that the agreement claimed to have been
made in the conversations at Morgan’s library and completed at the
stockholders’ meeting was not as defendant now claims for an accord
and satisfaction between the corporation and Ownbey for any balance
of account that should be outstanding at the time of the stockholders’
meeting provided that Ownbey made the conveyances and that the
stock was redistributed in the agreed proportions. While some of
the testimony of these witnesses, stating conclusions rather than
conversations, might bear this interpretation standing alone, the
rational construction to be put upon their testimony is, that these
stockholders agreed that a stockholders’ formal meeting should be
held soon thereafter and that at that meeting, in the language of
Cheney, they were “to consummate and put into legal form this
agreement which we had had”; that Ownbey would then convey to
the Wootton Company the property held by him in trust for it; that
there would be a redistribution of the capital stock, by which Ownbey’s
proportion would not be changed and Morgan’s would be changed
but very slightly and this would be a settlement of the proportionate
stock interests. This preliminary agreement was in December and
the stockholders’ meeting occurred in the following April. Mani
festly, it could not be known what balance of account would be owing
to or by Ownbey at that time. Ownbey admits a balance was due to
the company from him of $8,287.83 on April 16, 1910, and that he is
accountable for it, which would not have been true if all accounts
were to be then balanced at zero. It is also shown that he had other
balances in banks belonging to the company of $11,072.94. His page
of the ledger account in the books of the Wootton Company showed
further indebtedness to the company of $23,638.78. The special ac
countant was offered as a witness to show that he was further in
debted at that time to the company in the sum of $65,843.77. At
that same meeting in Morgan’s library an agreement in writing was
made by which $200,000 more was to be advanced to the capital of
the company to be sent to Ownbey. It is incredible that men of the
business sagacity of Morgan and Cheney would agree that one
who handled such large sums and who was later shown to be
indebted so largely should be excused from accounting for any
balance that might then exist for so slight a cause. Moreover, what
ever preliminary arrangements were made were merged into the
formal action at the stockholders’ meeting, as evidenced by the
minutes. The minutes recite that Ownbey presented a report of his
acts as vice-president, treasurer and general manager, and that that
report brought down to date the management of the Wootton Com
pany’s property and the moneys received and paid out by him for the
company and that this report was examined and found correct. A
resolution was passed approving the report. The report has not been
produced in evidence in this case, nor its contents shown, but the
formal action of the stockholders at a meeting at which all were
present or represented by proxies evidences the final transaction
between the parties. The minutes were afterwards presented to
Morgan and he approved them as a correct statement of the trans
action intended. Cheney himself presented the resolution and Ownbey
cast his own votes for it. The defendant relied upon this resolution
and the preceding report as an account stated that it be shown that
there is a balance due, the amount of that balance and from whom it
is due. Storey E. Pl. (10th Ed.) Sec. 798; Burk v. Brown, 2 Atkyns
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397,399; Harrison v. Farrington, 38 N. J. Ed. 358,362; Allen v. Woon
socket Co., 11 R. I. 288, 297; 1 Daniells Ch. Pl. & Pr. (6th Am. Ed.)
665; 1 Corpus Juris 641; 1 Ruling Law 211; 1 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 101.
As there was no proof of the balance shown by this report the court
erred in overruling plaintiffs’ exceptions to the report of the master
holding that the plaintiffs were estopped from asking for an account
ing prior to April 16, 1910, and in the order to the master to take
the accounting only from and after that date. The error requires a
reversal of the decree and the case will be remanded with directions
to proceed with the accounting with Ownbey as to these prior trans
actions. In stating the account between the parties after April 16,
1910, a balance was found by the master at that date, as has been
stated, of $8,287.83, consisting of cash on hand in the company’s
office and a deposit in the Trinidad National Bank. This amount was
evidently derived from Cheney’s testimony, but he did not testify,
nor was there other evidence to show what balance was shown by
Ownbey’s report which was approved by the minutes of the stock
holders’ meeting, as has been stated. Moreover, Cheney does not
testify that this was all the cash on hand as a fact, but only as a con
clusion and as true so far as he knew, and the evidence shows no suffi
cient basis for his knowledge. The accountants of defendant and
plaintiff agree and it stands established by undisputed testimony that
there was at that time the further sum of $10,144.64 in the First Na
tional Bank of Boulder in the name of Ownbey as trustee and the
sum of $928.30 in the American Exchange National Bank in the name
of Ownbey, and these moneys belonged to the Wootton Company
and were balances of sums contributed by Morgan and Cheney to its
capital account. The evidence is also undisputed that Ownbey pas
tured a number of his cattle and one horse on the company’s lands,
and that the reasonable charge for this service is $629.27. Exceptions
were taken to many items of credit and discharge claimed by Ownbey.
The master found that many of these items were improper charges
against the Wootton Company and disallowed them, and no excep
tions on the part of Ownbey now call in question this action. The
credits allowed Ownbey, and which are now questioned by appel
lants, are claims of disbursements of the company’s funds by Ownbey.
The items are very numerous and the evidence relied upon cannot
profitably be set out in detail. So far as the findings of the master
depend upon conflicting testimony or credibility of witnesses, and the
evidence in support of the item is legally competent the finding must
be allowed to stand. But where the items are supported by no com
petent evidence the findings must be disregarded because founded
upon a mistake in law. The defendant was permitted to testify to
general statements that he has never used, taken or expended any
funds of the Wootton Company for his personal use without having
them charged to himself on the company’s books. He qualified this
denial by an admission that he had used some of these funds for his
living expenses but claimed in such cases the withdrawals had been
charged to the company’s general-expense account. The master was
evidently influenced by this testimony in allowing many of the credits,
for other evidence is lacking in support of them as matters of dis
charge. The rules of law that were applicable in the taking of the
accounting may be briefly stated. When the defendant is an account
ing party and stands as one occupying a fiduciary relation toward the
plaintiff because of money or property intrusted to him, the burden
is upon him to show that he has performed his trust and the manner
of its performance. He owes this duty because of the confidential
relation he bears to his principal and because he is presumed to
know how he has performed his duty. I. Mechem on Agency (2nd.
Ed.), Sec. 1344; 1 Corp. Jur. 643; 3 Gr. on Ev. Sec. 253; 1 Story Eq.
Jur. (14 Ed.), Sec. 625; Marvin v. Brooks, 94 N. Y. 71, 75; Little v.
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Phipps, 208 Mass. 331, 335, 94 N. E. 260. He must therefore prove
any allowances or credits that he may claim to have made on behalf
of his principal. In making proof of credits claimed by him he
should present an itemized statement, showing the details of expendi
tures with the vouchers, receipts and memoranda supporting his
claim, Meth. Epis. Ch. v. Jaques, 3 Johns Ch. 77, 114. Muir v. Kala
mazoo Corset Co., 155 Mich. 441, 448, 119 N. W. 589; Campbell v.
Cook, 193 Mass. 251, 256, 79 N. E. 261; Chicago Title Co. v. Ward,
113 Ill. App. 327, 331; Moyses v. Rosenbaum, 98, Ill. App. 7, 9; 1
Mechem on Agy. (2nd. Ed.), Sec. 1344. It was formerly the rule
that the accounting party, if credible and uncontradicted, could sup
port by his oath sums not exceeding twenty dollars, but even in that
case he must show to whom the amount was paid, for what, and when,
and the whole amount of such items could not exceed $500. Remsen
v. Remsen, 2 Johns Ch. 496, 501; 2 Bates Fed. Eq. Proc. Sec. 764;
Daniells Ch. Pl. and Pr. (6th Am. Ed.), 1227, 1228. Whatever relax
ation from this rule may now be indulged, it is still requisite that the
accounting party shall show in detail and not in round sums the items
expended and show when, to whom and for what purpose the pay
ments were made, so that his principal can make a reasonable test of
the accuracy of his claim.
It follows as a corollary to these principles that the duty to ac
count is not fulfilled by a mere general statement that the money was
expended for the principal’s benefit or business or by a general denial
that any of the principal’s money was taken for the personal use of
the trustee. Such statements are but the conclusions of the witness
and afford no reasonable opportunity to the principal to test the fact
or the propriety of the expenditure and give the court no basis for
determining from the facts of each transaction whether the trustee has
faithfully performed his duty. 1 Mechem on Agy. (2nd Ed.), Sec.
1344, N. Y. Bay Cemetery v. Buckmaster, 33 Atl. 819; Webb v. Fordyce,
55 Ia. 14 7 N.W. 385; Farmers' Warehouse Assn. v. Montgomery, 92 Minn.
194, 200, 99 N.W. 776; Willis v. Clymer, 66 N. J. Eq. 284, 287, 57 Atl. 803;
in re Gaston 35 N. J. Eq. 60, 64; Romigs Appeal 84 Pa. St. 235, 237;
Wolf Co. v. Salem, 33 Ill. App. 614, 4,617; 2 Bates Fed. Eq. Proc. Sec.
764, 2. Daniells Ch. Pl. & Pr. (6th Am. Ed.) 1227, 1228.
Applying these principles to the groups of credits claimed by
Ownbey makes the proper disposition of them comparatively simple,
The “general expense items which are attacked amount to $2,288.75.
As to each of the numerous items there are either admissions by
Ownbey as a witness or evidence from the cheques or vouchers or
book entries, or a lack of testimony showing an expenditure for the
company’s purposes that requires the rejection of the claims. Ownbey
confesses a lack of memory as to the circumstances of the expendi
tures, except that he insists in general statements that they were for
the benefit of the company, which we have held does not discharge
his duty to account. The “living expenses” group of items amounts
to $22,484.57. The master finds that this was received by Ownbey
by cheques that he drew or from cheques deposited and was used by
him in payment of his living expenses, but the master also finds that
there was no evidence of the amount expended by Ownbey for these
living expenses in any one month or any one year and that the evi
dence as to the expenditures on moneys in this account is very un
satisfactory. He allowed the amount because of the manner in which
the accounts were kept and because of the acquiescence of all persons
interested. The contract relied upon by Ownbey allowed him his liv
ing expenses, not to exceed $500 per month, or $6,000 per year.
Claiming under a definite contract, it was incumbent on Ownbey to
show that his expenditures came within its terms. The absence of
proof of the amount of such expenses per month or per year was
a failure to show that he was entitled to credit therefor and the item
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should have been disallowed. There was no acquiescence by the
company in the matter of the keeping of the accounts that requires
any different conclusion. The books were kept by the bookkeepers
under Ownbey’s direct supervision. It was not shown that the other
officers or stockholders knew of any book entries charging them with
notice of this claim, because, as already stated, the books disclosed
no charge of any kind of Ownbey’s living expenses. The entire amount
appeared on the books as either charged to Ownbey’s personal ac
count or as charged to the general-expense account of the firm.
Traveling expenses allowed and attacked amount to $10,866.85.
Ownbey claimed and was allowed a large sum as credit for traveling
expenses in connection with the company’s business and another
group of such claims was disallowed. The items composing the bal
ance now in controversy were not supported by receipts or written
memoranda showing the expenditures to have been for the company’s
benefit nor was there other competent evidence of that fact. One
thousand three hundred and sixty-five dollars of the amount was
charged on the company’s books against Ownbey’s personal account.
Under the proofs the amount was improperly credited to Ownbey.
The “legal expense” account was a large one. Some of it was allowed
and some disallowed and the balance in controversy is $5,368.61. The
evidence again shows either lack of knowledge on the part of Ownbey,
as the only witness testifying on the subject, or else evidence is en
tirely lacking to show that these expenses were incurred on behalf
of the company. Much of the amount was drawn by cheques payable
directly to Ownbey. He must be held to have failed to have sus
tained the burden of proof required of him.
Intoxicating liquors, $1,914.97. This amount is shown to have been
disbursed to the dealers who sold liquors and was for liquors fur
nished to the Wootton ranch house or given by Ownbey as donations
to other persons. Appellants’ objection to the item is because of
lack of evidence showing the portion of the liquor used by Ownbey
for his personal uses. He testified it was all used for the company
and we think that was sufficient to support the master’s finding, as
further particularization could not reasonably be required of the final
use of these liquors.
Taxicab expenses, $1,436.25. There are proper receipts for these
bills and Ownbey’s testimony shows that the expenditures were all
for the company’s business and for the same reasons as stated re
lating to the previous item, the master’s allowance of the amount
should stand approved.
Telephone bill, $1,413.55. The testimony of Ownbey was relied
upon to show that these charges were properly made to the company,
but it was so contradictory and showed such lack of memory that the
allowance of the item cannot be sustained.
Interest on notes $1,392.38. This sum was used in paying interest
on notes but the notes were not entered upon the company’s books.
The Wootton Company’s notes were entered on its books and the
interest on those notes was also entered. There was a lack of tes
timony on the part of Ownbey and he did not sustain the burden that
was laid upon him to show that this was a proper charge. The item
should have been disallowed.
Miscellaneous items, $1,788.79. A number of items are embraced
in this total and each presents its separate state of facts. The charges
for expenditures to Sager $500, for turkeys, $88.45, for travel ex
penses of Bailey and others, $75, for expense in settling for death
of a miner, $250.00, total $913.45, are supported by sufficient evidence.
The remainder, aggregating $775.34, entirely lack evidence to support
them and should have been disallowed.
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Supplementary account. The allowance in favor of Ownbey of
two cheques of $1,000 each, was called to the attention of Ownbey as
a witness, but he was unable to remember the purposes of the ex
penditures and they were otherwise unsupported and should have
been disallowed. As we have held Ownbey chargeable with the bal
ances in the First National Bank of Boulder and in the American
Exchange National Bank of New York, he is entitled to credit for
$2,260.55 for cheques drawn on those banks as shown in his supple
mental account.
Another item of $250 to C. E. Stratton was improperly allowed
because it was paid on April 22, 1909, and if it was a valid charge
should be entered against the company as of that date, and it was not
involved in the accounting subsequently to April 16, 1910, which was
referred to the master. The disallowance of these items that have
been referred to is traceable entirely to Ownbey’s failure to furnish
sufficient proof. Ownbey appears to have been accustomed to busi
ness transactions, and the books were properly kept as to most trans
actions of the company and vouchers and receipts were commonly
supplied. The bookkeepers for the company appear to have been
skilled and to have kept the accounts properly so far as their infor
mation enabled them to do so. They depended on Ownbey for much
of the important information needed by them, and the failure of the
records as well as the failure of the testimony as to these particular
expenditures is traceable to Ownbey’s failure to record or remember
the times, amounts or purposes of the expenditures for which he now
asks credit.
Summarizing, the decree should be modified so that Ownbey will
be charged with the amounts that we have disallowed, but credited
with the amount of salary allowed by the master. The master’s
statement of the account of his transactions with the company since
April 16, 1910, will stand modified as follows:
Debits
To balance due to com
pany as per master’s
report ....................... $ 4,328.85
To pasturage.................
629.27
To balances in First Na
tional Bank of Boulder
and in American Ex
change National Bank
of New York ............ 11,072.94
To general expenses,
items disallowed ....... 2,288.75
To living expenses,
items disallowed ... 22,484.57
To traveling expenses,
items disallowed... 10,866.65
To legal expenses,
items disallowed... 5,368.60
To telephone expenses,
items disallowed... 1,413.55
To interest expenses,
items disallowed... 1,392.39
To miscellaneous expenses,
items disallowed ...
775,34
To supplementary account,
items disallowed... 2,250.00

Credits
By amount of salary . .. .$57,609.52
By cheques on First Na
tional Bank of Boulder
and on American Ex
change National Bank
of New York......... 2,260.55

$62,870.91

$59,870.07
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Balance due from Ownbey to the Wootton Company is $3,000.84. In
addition to this amount the plaintiff is entitled to an accounting of
transactions prior to April 17, 1910. Whether the balance of indebted
ness claimed to be shown against Ownbey on the ledger of the com
pany of $23,638.78 is a correct charge or whether the claim of a further
indebtedness of Ownbey at that time is correct is a matter that was
not heard fully on proofs by the court below, because of the holding
that the accounting should not extend to transactions prior to April
16, 1910, and cannot now be decided upon this record and no opinion
is expressed thereon.
The conclusions reached as to questions represented by the appeal
makes it unnecessary to consider more than one question presented
by the cross appeal. The essential facts relating to this cross appeal
are as follows: after the first reference to the master had been made,
some of the plaintiffs in the present case, that is, the plaintiffs who
sue as executors of the last will and testament of J. Pierpont Morgan,
began a suit in a state court of Delaware against the defendant
Ownbey, to recover the sum of about $140,000 for money loaned by
Morgan to Ownbey, and under an order of attachment a levy was
made upon Ownbey’s shares of stock in the Wootton Company.
Judgment was afterwards rendered in favor of these plaintiffs against
Ownbey for an amount exceeding $200,000. A petition by Ownbey
to have this judgment set aside was denied. Ownbey filed in the
court below a supplemental bill setting forth these proceedings in
the Delaware court and prayed and was granted a temporary order
against Morgan’s executors restraining the sale of Ownbey’s stock
under the judgment rendered in Delaware. This order was dissolved
by the court’s final decree and a permanent injunction denied, and
this is assigned as error. In support of the assignment it is urged
that the trial court in this case had first obtained exclusive jurisdic
tion of the subject matter which was being litigated in he Delaware
suit. There was no error in the court’s ruling. The suit in Delaware
was an action on behalf of Morgan’s representatives upon a personal
obligation of Ownbey originally due to Morgan. The res that gave
that court its jurisdiction to proceed was Ownbey’s stock in the
Wootton Company, attached by process in that action. The suit in
the court below was a suit by Morgan’s executors and by another,
as stockholders in a corporation, suing in behalf and for the benefit
of all stockholders, and asserting rights of the corporation as against
Ownbey. Claims of indebtedness between Morgan and Ownbey were
foreign to the questions of indebtedness between the Wootton Com
pany and Ownbey and the denial of the injunction was a proper com
pliance with section 265 of the judicial code.
For the reasons stated the case will be remanded with directions
to proceed further with the accounting ordered for the period prior
to April, 1910, if the parties are so advised, and otherwise the decree
will be modified to conform to the views expressed herein. The ap
pellants are entitled to their costs and expenses on the appeal in
case No. 5265, no costs to be taxed to either party in No. 5266.
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